The United Nations Commission on Human Rights

Has Failed the International Human Rights Movement

By Luckshan Abeysuriya

One of the key functions of the United Nations is to protect human rights, as stated in the Charter. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) was established by the General Assembly in 1946.  It is entrusted with promoting respect for human rights globally and protecting international human rights standards. The UNCHR should respond to violations by state parties and assist member states in building their human rights capacity.

Initially, the Commission was engaged mostly in standard setting and promotion.  In 1948, the historic Universal Declaration of Human Rights was enunciated under Eleanor Roosevelt, the chair of the Commission.  She is considered the main architect of the Declaration.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights became a beacon for affirmation of international human rights.  It was incorporated into the International Bill of Human Rights along with the Covenant for Political and Civil Rights and the Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1978.  Much of the early standard setting and evolution of human rights into international human rights law was the work of the UNCHR which, in spite of the early difficulties of the emerging Cold War, performed successfully.

During its early period to 1967, the Commission consisted of only 18 member states. These were some of the founder and other western states which dominated the initial work of the Commission.

During the 1950s, due to Cold War fears, the Republican dominated US Senate opposed some of the pioneering work of the Commission.  Republican Senator Bicker was a fervent critic of the Commission.  In 1953, President Eisenhower had to intervene to mitigate the opposition of the Senate.  The United States’ posture, and the mounting divisions of Cold War politics with the Soviet Union, affected the second function of the Commission, which is the defence and protection of human rights.                                                                                                  

In addition, during the 1960s, bloc politics frustrated the efficacy of the Commission.  Tolley[1] says that, from 1946 to 1967, the Commission was dominated by the western powers.  It was easier to engage in blocs when there were only 32 members.  During these formative years, the Commission was a vehicle of the West, and not only of the United States/United Kingdom axis.  But, on the more complex duties of protection of human rights, it was driven by the two blocs of the North.  Control in the Commission shifted to the South[2] with the entry of several Afro-Asian member states, by 1967, and the development of the politics of the Non-Aligned Movement.

During the decade to 1978, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Western Bloc’s arguments and regional politics enfeebled the Commission, particularly in its defence of human rights. The Non-Aligned Movement advocated economic rights and rights of self-determination, accusing South Africa and Israel of abuses.  However, the Northern bloc was able to mitigate the Non-Aligned Movement’s protests in the Commission, which made its effectiveness marginal on the great issues of apartheid and Palestinian rights.  This frustration and log-jam in the Commission lead to its near paralysis on the vital issues of economic, social and cultural rights and rights of self-determination. There developed a deep North-South divide in the Commission.[3]

For Zoller the strategy of ‘regionalization’, earlier developed by the Latin American bloc, was emulated by the Afro-Asian countries to the point where no decision, affecting any one country’s violations, could be taken in the Commission without the agreement of its regional grouping.[4]  The increasing trend towards ‘regional specificity’ had frustrating effects on the Commission's professionalism and efficacy. However, regionalism was not always negative sometimes it had a compensating benefit. Inter-Governmental (IGO) and Non-Governmental (NGO) pressures lead to an increasing range of human rights violations being brought to the Commission.   To try and alleviate regional pressures it created sophisticated procedures. The 1235 and 1503 procedures and working groups were set up in the Commission.

In the 1980’s, the Commission membership increased to 43 and, in 1992, increased again to 53. In the early 1980’s, the Latin American Bloc, with the help of the United States, helped mask the terrible human rights violations, such as disappearances, extra-judicial executions and torture, carried out by Argentina, Uruguay and Chile.[5]  As Guest says in his book, Argentina's War Against Human Rights and the UN, the Commission failed here in its inability to take action against the violations in those countries.

In the late 1980’s, with the help of NGO’s like Amnesty International and through the pioneering Working Group for Disappearances, the Commission was able to set up effective mechanisms.  The Commission's Special Reporters, working group for Torture and Cruel In-Human and Degrading treatment (CID), and its compliance mechanism the Committee against Torture, helped to formulate the, now universally accepted, United Nations Convention against Torture.  Much of the early work on the Torture Convention was helped by Amnesty International which is accredited to the UN, ECOSOC and was awarded the Human Rights/Peace prize for its work on Torture.  On the thematic issue of torture the Commission was successful in setting down an effective international standard. But, it failed in its compliance mechanisms. 

Given time state parties, whilst ratifying the Convention, found means of buttressing it with draconian domestic legislation on internal/national security issues and later, with counter-terrorism legislation.  The UK government, along with some of the founder members and Israel, were brought to book in the Commission for perpetrating torture or CID punishment.   But, with political lobbying and horse-trading they were able to get away without being named in the Commission.  The United Kingdom and Israel were able to hide from being castigated by the Commission, behind the mask of internal security and prevention of terrorism.  The latter was helped by the powerful US-Israel lobby, which sometimes turned a blind eye on the abuses of human rights on the peoples of the occupied territories in the West Bank and Gaza.

The Commission, in its current format of 53 members, is divided on regional lines and blocs. It is currently ineffective in its twin functions of standard setting and, more importantly, the protection of human rights in several countries. Its most recent and shameful failures are Rwanda, Srebrenica (10 years after) and now Darfur and Nepal. Heinous human rights violations have been carried out and the perpetrators have got off scot free, which is an affront to civilized standards.  The Commission’s six week annual sitting in Geneva is a forum, and a window of opportunity, for several NGOs, the media and observer states to participate and keep grave issues of human rights debated.  However, driven by excessive procedural red tape, such as the complex and in camera 1503 procedure, agenda setting and politicization has made the Commission very ineffective.  The Commission has neither the will nor the ability to overcome bloc politics to engage in its role as guardian of human rights.

The Commission is bogged down with a lengthy and an unwieldy agenda.  And the formal listing in the agenda provides little indication of the real, as opposed to the nominal, importance attached to human rights issues. However, it sits for an additional week for Pre-Sessional working groups. Sessional working groups have been used well, despite enormous pressure on smaller delegations. [6]  Alston says some items have consistently generated ‘mainly token resolutions’ and changed very little from year to year[7].  Others have proven to be genuinely open-ended and somewhat unpredictable in terms of their yield. [8]

The weakest members of the Commission shout the loudest, the most radical seek the most attention and the most ‘paranoid’ are the most critical.[9]  Debates sometimes fulfill many functions. One such is the re-affirmation of the principle of sovereign equality of state parties, such as enabling Fiji to speak for as long as the United States delegation on a particular issue.  Sometimes ideas are floated by smaller delegations. Signaling the changing and placing positions of States on the public record, serving notice to the international media and appealing to public opinion both at home and abroad.[10]

Philip Alston says many debates at the Geneva sittings are singularly sterile and they could be dominated or plagued by bi-lateral antipathies.[11]  The Commission's principal output consists of resolutions and decisions. As a result of expanded membership the methodology of these decisions have changed significantly.  Also, a more active role by several observer states (some 103) and the increase in resorting to consensus decision taking, often dilutes the efficacy of the resolution on the offending country.  In 1990, 77% of the 97 resolutions and decisions adopted by the Commission were achieved by consensus. In 1991, 6 out of the 10 resolutions under the chapter of human rights violations were also agreed by consensus. [12] Inter-Bloc negotiations have become a key aspect of the drafting process. One member of each bloc is usually designated as the principal negotiator on a given human rights violations. Philip Alston says this practice has worked well over the years. Although, it has given rise to situations in which a country being ‘scrutinized’ for grave abuses can play a very active role in determining the content of relevant Commission resolution.[13]

The greater emphasize on the consensus principle has resulted in some positive benefits. It has reduced the time taken for the adoption of some resolutions and thus avoided the spectacle of procedural wrangling over competing drafts in public. On the negative side, the consensus has somewhat hampered the ability to bring to book the greatest violators of human rights practices. This was the case of Argentina and Chile in the 1980’s, and lately the United States in Guantanamo Bay, Russia in Chechnya and in Nepal's disappearances of 2002-3.

The Commission has transformed itself over 5 decades, from a standard setting body to being capable of responding to human rights violations.[14] It has, to its credit and in spite of all of its weakness, pursued a wider range of initiatives designed to strengthen the rule of law and respect for human rights.  Due to political confrontations and bloc bargaining the Commission has sadly developed a mentality of defeatism. This has diluted its effectiveness in its core role as protector of human rights, which it helped to establish.  Let me now look at the Commission's relationship with other United Nations bodies and NGOs before I revisit the vexed question of what, or to what extent, the reform and revamp of the current Commission can achieve.

On the question of the relationship with other bodies, it has resulted in vertical and horizontal relationships within the United Nations system. On the vertical side the Commission is an integral part of the formal hierarchy of the UNGA, ECOSOC, Sub-Commission and now the OHCHR.  In horizontal terms the Commission relates to other United Nations bodies, specialized agencies and regional human rights bodies. In its horizontal relationships with each of the three regional human rights commissions, the Commission has been less successful than in its vertical connection, despite the similarity of their tasks. In the case of the African Human Rights Commission a greater effort has been made to work together in more recent years. Generally speaking the United Nation’s Geneva based Commission gives the impression of a body that operates without regard to its peers.[15]

On the question of NGOs, they have a vital role to play in the work of the Commission. However, here too the relationship has not been a cozy one. The ECOSOC grants consultative status to NGOs. It was only in the 1980s, when NGOs were able to enjoy relative freedom to name ‘Names’ of Countries in their submissions to the Commission.[16]  NGOs can, and are, still able to point the finger both inside Room XV11 (main forum) itself and in the surrounding meeting rooms.  In the Commission there has been a disparity between the dejure and the defacto roles of NGOs; the latter has mattered greatly.  In the context of the Commission's role of standards setter, the significant contribution of NGOs were noted.  Especially from the early 1980s and 1990’s, in both the Torture Convention, the drafting of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the draft declaration on Human Rights Monitors. Here Several NGOs played a key role.                                                                                                                                 

Over the last decade NGOs have become increasingly sophisticated in their approach to the Commission. Amnesty International now have a permanent office at Geneva and other influential NGOs such as the International Commission for Jurists and the Defence for Children International, have played important coordinating roles within the NGO community.  Even Amnesty International participates in co-operative lobbying exercises and is an active partner in many of them.[17]  Many NGOs have historically been from the North.  But, in the case of Disappearances Development and the Indigenous Peoples Rights, NGOs from the South have made significant contributions to the work of the Commission.  Though NGOs currently perform an indispensable role in the effective functioning of the Commission the state parties that make up the Commission only grudgingly accept their position.

Philip Alston states, when one assess the role of the Commission at present it can be a ‘forum’ and also an ‘actor’ playing the roles of Catalyst, Manager or Generator of norms and protector of human rights.[18]  In its role as a forum it has canvassed on great issues.  Such as the Aids pandemic, environmental degradation and child labour to mention a few new issues.  As a forum it also provided the space for focus on the internal conflicts between neighbouring states such as Arab- Israel, Greece and Turkey, Iran v Iraq. In the case of El Salvador, Romania and Iran it has produced a significant body of vital information that has helped to diffuse internal conflicts.

Several decades into its early life, the eminent jurist Hersch Lauterpacht[19] warned of the ‘danger’ of attributing to the Commission the responsibility which rests upon governments concerned. It is now felt, if the Commission has failed in human rights violations, say in China, it is not because as a collective entity it is ‘pusillanimous or has differed priorities, but because the majority of its member states do not wish it to act.’[20]  The Commission is not just the sum of its constituent parts (53 members), but also the Governmental Observers (around 110 State parties), the Secretariat, and the NGOs. All together these can influence a government/country’s understanding of the issues. The Commission has a unique ‘corporate culture’ built up over many years of experience.  That culture is often negative in that it errs on the side of protecting the status quo and undue deference to repressive states.[21]

Mainly through special reporters, the Commission, in its role as protector of individuals and groups affected by human rights abuses, has aspired to react rapidly. The thematic reporters have, using the model developed by the Disappearances Working Group pioneered by Amnesty International, begun to evolve a significant capacity for prompt and urgent actions on disappearances and incommunicado detention.[22]

Having analyzed the historical roles and evolution of the Commission, let us now focus on the current situation. In the light of 9/11, and the Unipolar-Realist paradigm in international relations dominated by the United States, both the United Nations and its progeny the UN Commission for Human Rights, which was the guardian/custodian of human rights, has sadly been marginalized.  The obsessional strategy of some states like the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States, to focus on counter-terrorism to elevate state security measures at the expense of civil liberties and human rights, has affected the work of the Commission and weakened defence of HRS.

The human rights movement is under attack. Not only from powerful states and their client states but, a general malaise has crept into the work of the Commission and human rights bodies under the aegis of UN systems such as the OHCHR.  There is no doubt that defence and respect for human rights standards are being eroded by terrorism and the counter terrorism measures taken by some states.  Due processes of the law and international conventions on human rights are being side tracked, with the help of powerful states, by countries with emergency draconian legislation like in Chechnya, Nepal and the Middle East. Due to the inherent weakness of the Commission’s composition it has not been able to focus and act decisively in many of the internal armed conflicts of Sudan, Nepal and other poorer countries. This development has debased the Commission, not only because of its inherent weakness but largely due to bloc-politics and Realpolitik. It has thus become a prisoner of its masters. 

Let us now look at some of the key recommendations and critic’s statements to see whether the current Commission could be reformed and revamped into an effective unit. I shall start with Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations, and his report by the high level panel of experts.  First, the United Nations Secretary General said in the Independent on the 8th April 05, ‘The UN Commission for Human Rights, failed to uphold human rights, and he accuses the Commission for undermining the credibility of the entire UN system and the Commission is guilty of protecting the National interests of its founder member states.’  These are very strong words spoken by the Secretary General, the Chief Executive of the United Nations, who believes strongly that the Commission is ripe for reform and also that a meager 2% of the UN budget is inadequate to promote and protect human rights in the current decade.[23]

The high level panel of experts appointed by the secretary general issued their report in Autumn 2004, ‘A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility - Threats, Challenges and Change to the United Nations.’  Here they make the following 7 points of reform for the United Nations Commission of Human Rights[24]:

1.  The Commission's membership of 53 is not ‘satisfactory.’ We recommend it be ‘expanded to Universal membership.’

2.  We believe the Member States of the Commission designate prominent and experienced human rights persons as head of their country’s delegations.

3.  The newly constituted Commission should be supported in its work by an Advisory Council or Panel of about 15 Individuals who are independent experts.  About 3 maximum from each region.

4. We believe the UNHCHR be called to prepare an annual report on the situation of human rights worldwide.  This report should be comprehensively discussed in the Commission focusing on implementation of human rights in all countries.

5.  The UNSC should be more actively involved with the OHCHR in its deliberations including peace operation mandates.

6.  More funding is required for the OHCHR.  There is a clear need to redress the limited funding available for human rights capacity building.

7.  In the longer term Member States of the United Nations should consider upgrading the Commission of Human Rights to become a Human Rights Council not subsidiary to the ECOSOC, as at present, but as a chartered body standing along side the UNSC, reflecting the weight given to human rights alongside security and economic issues.

Laura Mucha of UNA-UK, a human rights researcher, says in her article in the New World,[25] ‘Such a new Council of Human Rights, would be able to react to human rights crisis as they occur, rather than them waiting for the six week annual session in Geneva.’          

The seven key recommendations of the High Level Panel are creating a lot of debate in NGO and media circles. The first recommendation of a universal body has caused most debate and critical thought.  Even the United Nations Secretary General has expressed his initial opposition to it.  I believe the first recommendation should be dropped from the final submissions to the United Nations General Assembly as not feasible. It would create an unmanageable body which is even more cumbersome and slow to make important decisions on human rights violations, like the present one of 53. There is a strong case to reduce the size of the new body.  Such as, supporting the Commission with an advisory council of experts, proper funding and elevated to a council reporting to the UNSC with a strong line to the OHCHR.

A smaller and more dynamic Commission elected from countries whose human rights record is good should be preferred.  And membership of the new body must be earned on their commitment, in practice, to the promotion and protection of human rights standards. Not for political or regional basis or bloc representation.  This would be difficult in Realpolitik. But the Commission must exclude members who are violators of human rights in their own country or client states.  I strongly believe this would send a strong message to gross violators of international human rights standards that they are on moral trial and are on probation before they retain continued membership in the newly constituted smaller Human Rights Commission/Council.

Amnesty International's Secretary General, Irene Khan,[26] after her visit to Nepal in March 05 (which in 2003/4 had the highest number of disappearances) said,  “The Commission must act decisively and forcefully to reverse the human rights catastrophe unfolding in Nepal.” She further said, the Commission, in its current session in Geneva, should adopt a strong resolution on Nepal's human rights violations and appoint a special reporter for Nepal to ensure a strong international human rights monitoring process is established in that country.  Irene Khan further said, “that responsibility to avoid selectivity and double standards in the Commission rests with each member state.  Member states that support  ‘no action motions’ contribute to undermining both the Commission's credibility and its professionalism.”

Ms Khan said that human rights standards are undermined by measures taken by many governments in the context of the War on Terror.[27]  She concluded her interview, prior to departure to the Geneva sittings in March 05, with “the Commission's credibility is at its lowest point ever, reform of the United Nations machinery is urgently needed and substantial… tinkering around the edges is not enough.”[28]

Amnesty International makes a powerful case for the urgent reform of the current Commission. This is driven by political factionalism and ultra-national interests of member states which the United Nations Secretary General himself admitted in early April 05.  Other NGOs like the international Jurists, Consortium For Children, Violence against Women-coalition and UNA-UK, have expressed strong concern for the failure of the Commission, and seek urgent reform.  Let us hope this strong body of opinion will result in pressure from the international community to lobby the United Nations General Assembly at its special session in the autumn.  Not only to take cognizance of the salient points of the panel of experts but also the combined pressure of  NGOs to undertake urgent revamping and reconstitution of the United Nations Human Rights compliance mechanisms for the defence of human rights globally.

I can conclude this paper with optimism and hope, as a human rights activist, that firstly the United Nations Commission on Human Rights will be reformed effectively. And, secondly, whether I believe the human rights climate in the world will be better in the next few years.

On the question of reform of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights it is over-ripe for reform. Some changes will be undertaken by the United Nations General Assembly but will these suffice to make it an effective body and satisfy the NGOs and the wider human rights movement? Here I have my doubts, especially in the geo-political world we now live in where human rights sadly could become second preference to national/internal security.  I say this due to the prevalence of the doctrine of pre-emptive strike and emphasis on counter-terrorist measures in many states.  Thus, it is not only the machinery for defence of human rights we need to change but the attitudes and behaviour of key states and their proxies who have become the greatest violators of human rights.

Perhaps we need a judicial process with teeth.  Like a powerful ICC which has a clear mandate to bring to trial and punish perpetrators, rulers and governments that violate basic international human rights laws. This may not be feasible in the current climate of international relations, the United States foreign policy, driven by the Realist Paradigm[29], is not consistent with the old Liberal International Law Paradigm[30], which pervaded earlier international relations and jurisprudence.

I conclude this paper by saying not only has the Commission on Human Rights failed the international human rights constituency, in its role of protector and guardian of human rights, but also sadly the whole United Nations system has failed us in the real defence of human rights globally and that corrective reform needs to be taken urgently.

Notes and References

The UNCHR, 2 Reporting Procedures. 1235 and 1503

1253-Procedure was established on 6th June-1967 by ECOSOC. Under this procedure the Commission holds annual debates focusing on gross violations of human rights. The immediate origins of 1235 lay in the struggle against racism in general and apartheid in South Africa in particular.

The Committee on Decolonization of 1965, set the ball rolling to take action on South Africa. In 1967, the Commission established the ad-hoc working group of experts on human rights in South Africa.  Thus establishing a vital precedent in terms of formal investigation by the Commission on country specific human rights violations.

In the 1235 Procedure the ECOSOC gave the Commission responsibility not only to investigate human rights violations but also to report its findings and recommendations to its parent in the UNECOSOC.  From its early days the 1235 Procedure hit political problems, as the East European Bloc and the Afro-Asian blocs together tried to embarrass the West on racism and on Israel.

The 1235 Procedure later fell into further politicization when the Afro-Asian bloc prevented human rights violations in Bangladesh (ethnic killings) and the mass expulsion of Asians from Uganda under Idi Amin. There was a split in the Bloc, with the African countries imposing their will.

Phillip Alston states that in the case of Chile the Commission's 5 member Special Working Group of Experts (SWGE) investigating that country was the first situation which did not involve racism or colonialism.

The 1235 procedure underwent ‘metamorphosis’ due to several reasons in 1975-9, until it was given new impetus in the late 1979, when NGOs like Amnesty International and others created a far better informed public opinion and governments were being subjected to domestic pressure to do something about grave abuses of human rights especially on torture.

In Nicaragua under Somoza and in Guatemala the now effective Disappearance Working Group, DWG, enhanced the 1235 procedure.  However in the case of Turkey and the UK/NI, the Commission could not act decisively due again to patronage and the ‘clout’ by the great powers.

The 1503 Procedure: The ECOSOC established this procedure in 1970. This system was started to supplement 1235 not as a petition redress procedure but as a petition information system. It was more to use complaints as a means by which to assist the Commission in identifying situations involving a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested human rights violations.

The commission documented the 1503 Procedure into 4 parts:

1st stage:  It is activated by the Communications Working Group, CWG, and Sub-Commission of 5 members which distill the various complaints received in the preceding year.  

2nd stage:  Here the Sub-Commission considers each of its working group's nominees by a simple majority and send the country concerned to the Commission or drop, or reconsider, the complaint next year. The Government concerned is invited to submit written observations and defend itself before the Commission.

3rd stage:  Here the Commission also establishes its own working group it drafts recommendations as to action which the Commission might take on each country.

4th stage: The Commission devotes several days at each of its annual sessions to a consideration of all relevant material. At the end of its deliberations the Commission announces the names of the countries that have been considered and names those that have been let off the ‘hook’.

The 1503 Procedure is shrouded in secrecy, with each stage being accomplished in confidential sessions, only in some cases details are leaked to the media when the information goes into the public domain.  This procedure has both its critics and defenders. It has, since 1972, heard over 45 cases of which 36 were in Africa, Asia and Latin America equally, 2 in East Europe and only 1 in West Europe.

The 1503 procedure helped to galvanize some NGOs (even though sessions are confidential) and exposed the Commission and the Sub-Commission to the real world of human rights violations more effectively than any other procedure.

List of Acronyms- Abbreviations-

UNGA, United Nations General assembly

UNSC, United Nations Security Council

ECOSOC, UN, economic and social Council

UNSG, united Nations Secretary - General

UNCOM, HR- United Nations Commission for Human rights

UN Sub-Com, sub -commission for Human rights

UDHR, Universal declaration of Human rights

ICCPR, International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights

ICESCR, International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural rights

IBHR, International Bill of Human rights

IHRL, International Human Rights Law

UNCAT, AND CID, The United Nations Convention against Torture, and cruel, Inhuman and degrading treatment

CAT, Committee against Torture

WGD, Working Group for Disappearances

UNCRC, - United Nations convention for the Rights of the Child

SVAW, Stop violence against Women campaign

NAM, Non- Aligned Movement

AI, Amnesty International

UNA-UK, United Nations Association -UK,

NGOs, Non- Governmental Organizations

IGOs, Inter- Governmental organizations

ICC, The International Criminal Court

UNHCHR, UN, High Commissioner for Human Rights

OHCHR, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

HRVs Human Rights Violations

HRS, Human rights Standards

About the Author                                                                   

Luckshan Abeysuriya born in Sri Lanka has lived in the UK for 45 years. He is a retired Professional Accountant. He has read for an MA in International Relations and Strategic Studies at Lancaster University 1988-9, then followed the International Law and Humanitarian Law- LLM course, and went on to do PhD, research on the UN-Torture Convention and CID.

He has mastered the complex inter-relationship of UN peacekeeping, peace building and peace making and has extensive knowledge and expertise on the UN, and Cyprus problem.  His research interests have wide scope on International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, including the theory and practice on Torture and Genocide.

Luckshan was a volunteer board member of Amnesty International UK for 7 years, and the Nepal Country Co-coordinator for 5 years, until he retired in March 05 to devote his time and expertise as a national board member of UNA-UK concentrating on peace building and human rights concerns.

He is also knowledgeable on the workings of the EU and has written 2 booklets on the Maastricht Treaty 1992 and the Amsterdam Treaty 1996/7. And carried out research on the proposed European Constitution.

Acknowledgements

I am greatly indebted to Tony Simpson and Ken Coates of the Bertrand Russell Foundation for Peace and Human Rights in Nottingham for encouraging me to write this paper with a view to publishing it in time for the European Network of Peace and Human Rights Conference in the European Parliament in October 05.

I owe thanks and appreciation to Tim Baynes for scrutinizing my text for syntax. To Mary Ann Best of Grange Now for publishing and print expertise and last but not least to my wife Barbara for her patience and support whilst I have been busy on this project.

I hope the human rights movement will read my paper carefully and galvanize support for the overdue reform of the Commission when it is debated in the special session of the UN General Assembly this autumn.

Thank you

Luckshan Abeysuriya- Cumbria , April 05

End-piece

Post Script- to the 59th Geneva sittings of the UNCHR, concluded 18th -April-05

On the conclusion of the 6 weeks current sittings of the UNCHR in Geneva and on the country concerns on HRVs in Nepal, AI's Asia- Pacific Regional Programme Director Dr Puna Sen said:

“We challenge claims made by Foreign Minister Pandey of Nepal - Royalist Government in Geneva that the King's measures will bring stability and security.”[31]

Amnesty International highlighted the recent escalation in violence and large number of casualties including civilians. Amnesty International also expresses serious concern about emergence of mob violence apparently encouraged by the state, which has spread terror among local communities.  Amnesty International welcomed the agreement (resolution 19) proposed by the Troika of Powers, United States, United Kingdom and India, for the OHCHR to monitor human rights in Nepal. Puna Sen said, “This is a very important step towards improving the appalling human rights situation that people of Nepal face today.” She concluded by saying that “the International community cannot afford to be complacent.”

There was no agreement, however, by the Troika to move a more stringent resolution 9 to ‘name and shame’ the government of Nepal or to appoint a special reporter to investigate grave human rights abuses in Nepal.[32]