New Issue (No.99) The Spokesman founded by Bertrand Russell
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Obama's Afghan Dilemma
Editorial
by Ken Coates Ending the War without End Obama’s Afghan Dilemma Taking stock of Afghan wars When asked for his motto, Karl
Marx said ‘doubt everything’. Never was this better advice than in
the case of official views about the war in Iraq. Even more is this true
in the case of hostilities in Afghanistan. What is not in doubt is that the
cost of operations in Afghanistan continues to mount, and the casualties
relentlessly levy their toll. More dubious are the apologies for this
war. A whole group of the critics of the war in Iraq have sought a
bolthole from the reproach that they have lacked patriotic ardour by
aggressively arguing that too much mayhem in Iraq has made more
difficult what they now claim to be the more necessary war in
Afghanistan. Notable among these people is, apparently, Barack Obama,
whose views we must consider later.1 Initially, the conflict between
the United States and the Taliban Government was directed towards the
destruction of Al Qaeda, and the Taliban were led to think that maybe
they could be spared if they gave up Osama Bin Laden and surrendered his
men for punishment. Hostilities were not, in the beginning, mainly
pursued by American boots on the ground, but by extensive bribery and
the deployment of remorseless air power. The bribery was shrewdly
directed towards the warlords along the northern border of the country.
Some of these people, but by no means all, were simply bandits and the
operation depended on the passive engagement and air bases of Central
Asian Republics from the former Soviet Union. At that time the Russians
looked kindly on the American War on Terror, although their ardour may
have been somewhat cooled by subsequent United States depredations and
subversions in the territories of the ‘near abroad’. Thus, some of
America’s cash-conscious Afghan allies became a wasting asset, and it
is a little early to evaluate the significance of renewed agreements on
the use of the airbase in Uzbekistan.2 As the post 9/11 Afghan war
opened up, United States special operations provided a few hundred
soldiers, along with a number of CIA operatives who were more or less
familiar with the terrain, having previously nurtured and then sustained
the forces of Osama Bin Laden. A vast resource in air power was the most
material help given to the formerly Russian and Iranian sponsored
warlord forces who finally lanced the Taliban boil. But they did this by
relying on their ability to call down American air strikes which were
most effective against the cities. This rather firmly persuaded the
Taliban to withdraw from cities and targetable emplacements and repair
to the countryside. We are reminded of the story of Brer Rabbit, who was captured by Brer Fox, and threatened with brutal punishment. ‘Do not’ said Brer Rabbit, ‘whatever you do, put me into the briar patch, Brer Fox. Anything but the briar patch.’ Not unnaturally, Brer Fox, like the Americans, immediately threw Brer Rabbit, just like the Taliban, into the briar patch. Born and bred in the briar patch’, said the Taliban, as they withdrew and readied hemselves for a renaissance. In the event, Al Qaeda was
disrupted but not destroyed. American military deployment did much to
revive and extend it. The Taliban, in contrast, maintained much if not
most of their military capacity. The newly elected Government of
Afghanistan, headed by Hamid Karzai, was advertised as expected to
defeat the Taliban in due course, and it was to help it that 50,000
troops were subsequently despatched by various Nato members to
Afghanistan. Unfortunately, these proved inadequate to contain the
Taliban forces, while the Americans themselves deployed enough soldiers
to hold major cities and, from time to time, mount forays which could
hinder the Taliban in the countryside, whilst widely alienating the
surrounding population. |
