Peter Nicholls
Abolition 2000 UK, 601 Holloway Rd., London N19 4DJ UK.
The idea that a NWC could become a viable international treaty proposal along the lines of the Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons Conventions has recently been promoted by a group of organisations including IPPNW and IALANA in the USA and by the international Abolition 2000 group (cf. ref. 1). It has achieved the status of a UN (Middle Powers Initiative/New Agenda Coalition) resolution, albeit one which ran into substantial opposition. The idea is supported by the existence of the 1996 International Court of Justice advisory opinions on nuclear weapons, although these have been consistently ignored by the nuclear weapons states. In the 2000-2001 Parliamentary session in the UK, EDM ("Early Day Motion") 652 received over 100 signatures, the support of Menzies Campbell, Foreign Affairs spokesperson of the Liberal Democrat party, and attention by the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs. At the same time US House of Representatives motion 82 advocated US participation in negotiations that might lead to such a convention. The European Parliament has voted in its favour. Both Canada & Germany have sought (rather unsuccessfully) to have such a convention or related matters of policy considered by NATO.
As formulated by the founding document (ref. 2) the model NWC contains a series of obligations that would be difficult to establish and subsequently enforce. There is certainly no hope that the current US administration would adhere to the proposed restrictions. These obligations are of two kinds, positive and negative, and directed at two constituencies: (i) the states party to the proposed treaty or convention, and (ii) the citizens of the states party to such a convention.
The negative obligations that would be required of a state would be not to use, to threaten with, to develop or to deploy any type of nuclear weapon. In addition they would have positive obligations - to destroy all previously existing weapons, to submit to international inspection regimes, and to entrench in their domestic law the obligations both upon them selves and upon their citizens. The latter - personal - negative obligations would include an understanding that no individual would engage in development or deployment of nuclear weapons. To do so would be a personal domestic crime. The positive obligations of a citizen would be to report any violations of the convention which came to their notice or which they suspected were taking place. Sanctions against non-compliance would therefore be needed both in domestic and in international law.
A Nuclear Weapons Convention Agency would be required, to set up the necessary organisation and to establish verification procedures and facilities. In its present form (ref. 2) the model NWC would place upon the UN Security Council the job of securing compliance once a Convention had been ratified.
Numerous problems en route can be envisaged. The major one is that of the "security" (cf. ref. 3) which nuclear weapons are perceived as providing, both to the nuclear weapons states themselves and to those other states protected by the nuclear 'umbrella' of allied NW states. It is still believed that nuclear weapons have a deterrent effect not only upon the threat of nuclear weapons use per se but also upon the use of other weapons of mass destruction, including strategic chemical and biological devices (despite the negative assurances apparently given by the NW states to non-NW states under the Non-Proliferation Treaty). It is thought that breakout from such a convention would be relatively easy for a powerful state with advanced technology in a time of geopolitical uncertainty. And the existing problems of nuclear munitions disposal (primarily plutonium) would be greatly exacerbated by a NWC.
These problems essentially fall into two categories, the 'internal' problems and the 'external' problems. The internal problems for a NWC are those that would be inherent in the arrangements for such a convention, even assuming relatively good will on the part of prospective states party. The breakout problem, details of verification procedures, difficulties of radioactive and other munitions disposal, and of securing a realistic time frame are all of this 'internal' type. More significant at the present time are the external problems for a NWC. These are the problems in getting the nuclear weapons powers to consider a treaty or even to listen to its advocates. The UK, France, Israel, India, Pakistan, Russia, China, the USA and NATO all have what seem to them - and may even be - good reasons for not listening at the present time, and those reasons differ from one state or alliance to the next.
A clear cut convention of the model NWC type is not the only possible route to nuclear weapons abolition. At least two other such routes are conceivable, the first dependent upon actions by the NW states themselves, the second upon actions by non-nuclear weapons states. Firstly, as recently apparently agreed in discussions between Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, unilateral measures of weapons reduction by the two major NW Powers may stimulate progressive weapons reductions towards zero, and similar unilateral initiatives by other NW powers both declared and undeclared. For example, the UK has abandoned all its nuclear weapons capabilities other than the Trident submarine force, and claims debatably to have reduced the targeting and warhead options of the latter. South Africa, following the abandonment of apartheid and governmental changes there, also abandoned its independent NW programme, as have the successor states to the USSR (Ukraine, ByeloRus and others) with the exception of Russia itself. However this route seems uncertain in its broader aspects. And the unilateral abrogation of the ABM treaty by the USA may result in increases in nuclear weapons capabilities or perceived requirements within the minor and middle nuclear weapons states (India, Pakistan and China).
The second indirect route to nuclear weapons abolition would be the extension across the globe of the present network of NWFZ. Such zones are presently declared and agreed for South America, for Africa, for the Southern Pacific region, and for Antarctica. In addition Canada, despite its membership in NATO, has chosen not to permit nuclear weapons on its territory or adjoining seas and the Scandinavian states (Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland) are nuclear weapons free. The existing de facto NWFZ in Central and Eastern Europe may be continued indefinitely and could be enshrined in an international treaty.
The present shadow over all international agreements engendered by US withdrawals from the majority of those with which it has been concerned and within which it has participated in the recent past makes future progress, either formal or informal, towards nuclear weapons abolition, along with that of all other weapons of mass destruction, seem problematic. When the US position and governments change, however, we may have a "catch-up" opportunity in which previously outlandish suggestions such as a NWC appear on the standard negotiating table. Or at least optimism of this sort is essential if we are to survive the present dark time. To enhance this optimism we at Abolition 2000 in the UK, together with Christian CND and Medact, are holding a Day School in February (ref. 4) to consider the present status of worldwide agreements controlling and restricting the use, testing and distribution of nuclear weapons. We must not lose sight of the ideas of sustaining, continuing and increasing the areas of international agreement on these issues, even now.
References
1. Blackaby Paper #1: Alternative Futures by Frank Blackaby (2000) published by Abolition 2000 UK, London, England.
2. Security and Survival: the case for a nuclear weapons convention (1999) published by IALANA and IPPNW, New York, USA.
3. Shakespeare, Wm. in Macbeth: "And you should know security is Mortals' chiefest enemy".
4. Treaties Day School, February 16th., 2002, London School of Economics, London, UK. (details available from Abolition 2000 UK: phone +44 20 7281 4281).