On 10th March 2002, excerpts form the United States Government's classified review of its use of nuclear weapons (known as the Nuclear Posture Review) were discussed publicly for the first time in an article by William Arkin in the Los Angles Times. Two days later, the Russell Foundation took up some of the important issues raised by the Review in a series of letters, amongst other, to the Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Greece, Ireland, and Sweden. Here, we publish our initial letter together with the replies we have received.
Letter from The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation - Replies from George A. Papandreou, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Greece - Anna Lindh, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sweden - Bill Graham, Foreign Minister of Canada - Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs, France - from the Office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ireland - from the Office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Portugal - Erkki Tuomioja, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Finland
Dear Foreign Minister
On 10th March 2002, the Los Angles Times publishes an important article on the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). This is a classified document which was delivered to Congress on January 8th. The article appears under the by-line of William M. Arkin, himself a distinguished scholar, with an encyclopaedic knowledge of nuclear weapons matters and disarmament lore.
As he says, with this document, the Bush administration "reverses an almost two-decade-long trend of relegating nuclear weapons to the category of weapons of last resort". It also, says Arkin, "redefines nuclear requirements in hurried post-September 11th terms". The document seeks the development of a whole range of new nuclear weapons and support systems, and their integration with conventional military and cyber warfare capacities.
Plans for nuclear strike capabilities involve "the recognition of 'immediate, potential or unexpected' contingencies. North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya are named as 'countries that could be involved' in all three kinds of threat". China and Russia are also named as potential targets. We enclose the Arkin story and we think you will agree that it poses acute and urgent problems.
Firstly, the Nuclear Posture Review seeks to outline plans for nuclear war fighting, ending the status of nuclear weapons as "weapons of last resort". What does this change imply for the conduct of America's alliances, above all the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation? Clearly it is impossible for the United States to modify its own nuclear policies in this way without creating melt-down in those of its allies. Nato traditionally presented its nuclear doctrine as involving minimum deterrence. But the new doctrine specifically abandons this commitment. A widely held supposition is that pointed out in The Independent (11th March 2002): "Nato has an established doctrine of not planning first use of nuclear weapons, and this document would seem to be in clear breach of it". Be that as it may, quite certainly, Nato's commitment to the United Nations Charter as its own founding text must be incompatible with the new Nuclear Posture Review.
In addition to the problems which are posed for Nato member-states, very serious questions are raised for the formerly neutral powers which embrace the "Partnership for Peace", as part of the evolution of Nato's diplomatic role after the conclusion of the Cold War.
The change which is now announced transforms the significance of President Bush's earlier announcements about the reduction in the numbers of long-range nuclear missiles. Tactical and "adaptive" nuclear capabilities mark out such a change in nuclear deployment. In particular, it can no longer be argued that the repudiation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is in any way linked with serious nuclear disarmament measures.
Since September 11th, the United States has concluded that nuclear deterrence is inoperable. Instead, as has been shown in Afghanistan, there is reliance upon precision weapons, long-range strikes, and special and covert operations, which are now to be joined together with a new component of nuclear capability. Within the context of space war, this development becomes all the more daunting. Any reassurance which might have been drawn from the reduction of the numbers of long-range nuclear rockets suddenly dissolves in this turbulent new context.
With the mutation of war-fighting doctrine, previous arms control measures are severely damaged or destroyed. The participants in nuclear-free zones will form their own evaluation of these changes: but the most important instrument hitherto available within the non-proliferation regime has been, of course, the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Today it is clear that the United States is willing to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear weapons states, in a range of circumstances.
Taken together, these problems indicate the severe implications of the Nuclear Posture Review. What should be done to focus the attention of the Nato Alliance members on these questions, and how should they address the dangers involved in the Nuclear Posture Review? What can members of the Partnership for Peace do to uphold the non-proliferation regime, and to restrain American nuclear belligerence? How should Europe deal with this threat, in association with Russia and other states which are directly affected, especially China?
It seems to us that perhaps it is necessary to elaborate a general appeal on these matters, and I would very greatly value your thoughts on this matter, as soon as you are able to send them.
Replies from
George A. Papandreou, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Greece
Anna Lindh, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sweden
Bill Graham, Foreign Minister of Canada
Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs, France
from the Office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ireland
from the Office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Portugal
Erkki Tuomioja, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Finland